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ABSTRACT
Background Effective teamwork facilitates
collective learning, which is integral to safety
culture. There are no rigorous evaluations of the
impact of team training on the four components
of safety culture—reporting, just, flexible and
learning cultures. We evaluated the impact of a
year-long team training programme on safety
culture in 24 hospitals using two theoretical
frameworks.
Methods We used two quasi-experimental
designs: a cross-sectional comparison of hospital
survey on patient safety culture (HSOPS) results
from an intervention group of 24 hospitals to a
static group of 13 hospitals and a pre-post
comparison of HSOPS results within intervention
hospitals. Dependent variables were HSOPS
items representing the four components of safety
culture; independent variables were derived from
items added to the HSOPS that measured the
extent of team training, learning and transfer.
We used a generalised linear mixed model
approach to account for the correlated nature of
the data.
Results 59% of 2137 respondents from the
intervention group reported receiving team
training. Intervention group HSOPS scores were
significantly higher than static group scores in
three dimensions assessing the flexible and
learning components of safety culture. The
distribution of the adoption of team
behaviours (transfer) varied in the intervention
group from 2.8% to 31.0%. Adoption of team
behaviours was significantly associated with
odds of an individual reacting more positively
at reassessment than baseline to nine items
reflecting all four components of safety
culture.
Conclusions Team training can result in
transformational change in safety culture when
the work environment supports the transfer of
learning to new behaviour.
INTRODUCTION
Safety culture can be defined as the
learned, shared, enduring values and
behaviours of organisation members
regarding the organisation’s willingness
to detect and learn from errors.1–3
According to Reason,4 four components
of organisational safety culture interact to
achieve learning and high reliability:
reporting culture, just culture, flexible
culture and learning culture. The knowl-
edge, skills, attitudes, language and
coordinating mechanisms inherent in
teamwork5 create the flexibility team
members need to manage complexity6
and learn from experience.7–9 Effective
team functioning is comparable to
Reason’s flexible component of safety
culture. However, observed behaviours
are often not consistent with stated
organisational values3 because individuals
lack the knowledge, skills and manage-
ment support10–12 to sustain desired
behaviours and achieve high reliability.13
Team strategies and tools to enhance
performance and patient safety
(TeamSTEPPS) is a team training pro-
gramme developed by the US
Department of Defense and the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) to teach the knowledge and
skills that comprise effective teamwork.
These skills are: leadership, situation
monitoring, mutual support and commu-
nication.14 There is evidence that success-
ful team training and effective teamwork
improve patient outcomes15–22 and team-
related dimensions of safety culture.23
However, team training alone may not
produce the desired results.24 25 A
meta-analysis found that team training
accounted for less than 20% of the
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variance in team performance.26 The primary deter-
minant of team performance is what an organisation
does after training to sustain or routinise team beha-
viours.11 27 To our knowledge, there are no rigorous
evaluations of the impact of team training on all four
components of safety culture. Given the ability of
effective teamwork to facilitate collective learning,8
we hypothesise that the adoption of team behaviours
within a hospital will positively impact all components
of safety culture and contribute to transformational
culture change.28
The use of theoretical frameworks advances our
knowledge of organisational factors that are fundamen-
tal to successful implementation and sustainment of
innovations such as team training.29 The ‘Diffusion of
innovations’ framework of Rogers30 identifies charac-
teristics of innovations, individuals and organisations
that are associated with the adoption of new ideas and
stages of adoption. The cross-sectional distribution of
adoption within individuals and organisations typically
follows a normal distribution. Based on this distribu-
tion, Rogers30 described five categories that help to
explain variation in adoption: innovators, early adop-
ters, early majority, late majority and laggards. When
used for evaluation purposes, these categories are stan-
dardised by deciding the number of categories to use,
the proportion of organisations to include in each cat-
egory and the method of defining categories. In
general, innovator and early adopter organisations suc-
cessfully implement and sustain innovations because
they tend to have slack resources, remain connected to
experts, and have champions who overcome barriers.30
These characteristics facilitate movement through
organisational stages of innovation: agenda-setting to
solve a problem, matching the problem to an innov-
ation, redefining/restructuring the innovation to fit the
organisation, clarifying the relationship between the
organisation and the innovation, and making the
innovation routine.30
The four-level taxonomy of training criteria by
Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick31 is widely used to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of training programmes. The ori-
ginal taxonomy has been augmented as follows:32
▸ Level 1: Reaction to training, including satisfaction and
assessment of the utility of the training.
▸ Level 2: Learning, including immediate post-training
changes in knowledge, knowledge retention and demon-
stration of skill.
▸ Level 3: Transfer of learning to behaviour that is applied
in the work environment (transfer is synonymous with
the adoption of new behaviours).
▸ Level 4: Results, the degree to which desired outcomes
are achieved as a result of transfer.
Success at levels 1 to 3 increases the likelihood of
achieving level 4—desired results such as transform-
ational change in safety culture.32
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the
impact of a team training intervention on hospital
safety culture. We used Kirkpatrick’s taxonomy as the
overall framework for our evaluation. As Rogers’
‘Diffusion of innovations’ framework explains vari-
ation in the adoption of new behaviours (Kirkpatrick’s
level 3—transfer), we report intervention hospital
characteristics, respondent characteristics and hospital
survey on patient safety culture (HSOPS) results
(Kirkpatrick’s level 4) by Rogers’ adopter categories.30
The linkage between these two frameworks and a
HSOPS outcome are illustrated in figure 1.
METHODS
Setting and participants
The 37 hospitals in this study were critical access hos-
pitals located in three central US states. These hospi-
tals served 37 distinct counties that had a median
2009 population of 7766.33 The category, ‘critical
access hospital,’ was created in 1997 by the US gov-
ernment to maintain access to healthcare in rural areas
by providing cost-based reimbursement for services
provided to Medicare beneficiaries. These hospitals
are limited to 25 beds and must be located more than
35 miles from another hospital;34 they comprise one-
fourth of the general community hospitals in the
USA.35
From 2005 to 2007, 19 of the 37 hospitals in this
study participated in our AHRQ-funded project that
sought to implement the patient safety practice of
organisational learning from voluntary medication
error reporting.36 The remaining 18 hospitals became
engaged in the improvement collaborative through the
Nebraska Office of Rural Health and hospital net-
works. Of the 37 hospitals, 24 had an existing base-
line assessment of safety culture conducted within
18 months before the beginning of the intervention in
April 2008. These 24 agreed to participate in the
intervention. The remaining 13 did not participate in
the intervention and thus created a static group for
comparison.37 This study was approved by the
University of Nebraska Medical Center Institutional
Review Board.
Intervention description
The intervention was conducted from February 2008
to March 2009 and was intended to improve safety
culture by implementing and sustaining team beha-
viours in the 24 intervention hospitals. It included the
following activities:
▸ agenda-setting for improvement using the baseline
assessment of safety culture to identify weaknesses in
teamwork and communication;
▸ matching safety culture weaknesses to TeamSTEPPS
tools;
▸ conducting the TeamSTEPPS train-the-trainer course14 in
April 2008 to train master trainers for each intervention
hospital;
▸ conducting a workshop on 6 October 2008 to address
disruptive behaviour;38
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▸ conducting a TeamSTEPPS fundamentals14 course on 7
October 2008 to train coaches to assist with implementa-
tion; and
▸ conducting 17 one-half hour conference calls to share
strategies and tools for redefining/restructuring, clarify-
ing and routinising behaviours to sustain the innovation.
Summaries of the calls were distributed via email to
intervention hospitals.
Strategies to redefine and clarify the innovation
included focusing initial training efforts on supervisors
who then role-modelled desired behaviours by conduct-
ing briefs, huddles and debriefs. The Situation
Background Assessment and Recommendation (SBAR)
format was used to structure email communication and
fax forms to physician offices. Bulletin boards, newslet-
ter articles and contests were used to clarify and provide
additional learning opportunities after classroom train-
ing. Strategies to routinise behaviours included auditing
the frequency with which tools were used, conducting
hospital-wide briefs, integrating the use of TeamSTEPPS
tools and strategies into new employee orientation, and
including the use of TeamSTEPPS tools in job descrip-
tions and performance appraisals.
Instrument and data collection
We conducted the AHRQ HSOPS in March 2009 as a
reassessment for the intervention group of 24 hospi-
tals and a baseline assessment for the static group of
13 hospitals. The HSOPS is a psychometrically
sound39 40 instrument developed by AHRQ to
provide healthcare organisations with a valid tool to
assess safety culture.41 It is widely used in the USA
with results from 1128 hospitals in the 2012 com-
parative database.42 It consists of 42 items categorised
in 12 dimensions and two items that are outcome
measures. These 44 items reflect Reason’s four com-
ponents of safety culture.36
We customised the HSOPS to evaluate the impact
of patient safety interventions on safety culture in crit-
ical access hospitals. In 2005, we revised the work
areas and job titles in the demographics section to cat-
egorise staff accurately in these small hospitals.36 For
this study, we added one item to measure respondents’
extent of TeamSTEPPS training, four items to measure
learning (level 2) as knowledge of TeamSTEPPS tools,
and five items to measure transfer (level 3) as a
respondent’s perception of the frequency with which
Figure 1 Evaluation of the impact of team training on safety culture using Rogers’ adopter categories.
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TeamSTEPPS tools and strategies were used. The
learning and transfer items were internally consistent
and are available on request.
To conduct the survey, key contacts at participating
hospitals provided a list of eligible employees according
to the criteria recommended in the survey user’s
guide.41 We assigned a unique identifier to each
employee that was linked to their name and hospital.
We used this linkage to: personalise the invitation to
participate in the survey (personalisation increases likeli-
hood of response);43 calculate accurate response rates
by hospital; track change in individual responses at the
item level from baseline to reassessment; and adjust for
the correlated nature of the data. At baseline and
reassessment, we used the Dillman tailored design meth-
odology43 to conduct the survey as a self-administered
paper instrument, as described elsewhere.36
Study design and statistical analyses
Returned surveys were scanned into a database and
imported into SAS V.9.2 for analysis. We conducted a
cross-sectional comparison of the HSOPS results from
the intervention group of 24 hospitals to the static
group of 13 hospitals and a pre-post comparison of
HSOPS results within the intervention hospitals
according to Rogers’ adopter categories.30 Due to our
small sample of 24 intervention hospitals, we col-
lapsed Rogers’ five adopter categories into three, and
we used the quartile distribution of the perception of
transfer to achieve three balanced groups: six hospitals
were categorised as laggards, 12 as early/late majority
and six as early adopters (figure 1).
Statistical analyses to test for differences in hospital
and respondent characteristics by groups were chosen
based on the type and distribution of data. Tests used
in tables 1 and 2 are described in the footnotes. We
calculated the mean percent positive scores for
HSOPS items and dimensions for each group and cat-
egory of hospitals according to the method in the
survey user’s guide.41 We determined the internal
consistency of the survey items by calculating
Cronbach’s α coefficient for each dimension at the
hospital level, and then we averaged the hospital level
coefficients for each dimension by group and adopter
category.
All data summarising HSOPS results presented in
supplementary appendix A (available online only),
tables 3 and 4 were considered representative values
of a population of hospitals to support a broad infer-
ence. Consequently, all data were analysed using
PROC GLIMMIX (generalised linear mixed
model),44 which provides a choice of distributions for
the dependent variable, accounts for random effects
(clustering of respondents within hospitals) or corre-
lated data (repeated measures), and provides either
subject-specific or population-averaged inferences.44
The dependent variable was an individual positive
response to a survey item, which was a binary
outcome measured pre and post-intervention. Within
PROC GLIMMIX, analysis of a binary distribution
utilises a logit link that provides OR. We used this
technique to model the OR of a respondent in an
intervention hospital reacting positively to an item at
reassessment compared to baseline (table 3), and for
each 5% increase in the proportion of respondents
reporting TeamSTEPPS training, learning and transfer
(table 4). To calculate these OR in table 3, we used
data from those respondents in the intervention group
who had both baseline and reassessment results.
Those respondents were significantly more likely to
have been at the hospital for 6 years or longer com-
pared to those respondents without baseline data
(75% vs 37%, p<0.0001).
We chose 10 survey items to compare the odds of a
respondent reacting positively at reassessment and
baseline. These items were chosen because they assess
behaviours that reflect the four components of safety
culture such as near-miss reporting and teamwork,
and they were the least positively perceived items
within a dimension. All statistical tests were two-sided,
Table 1 Characteristics of 37 hospitals participating in 2009 hospital survey on patient safety culture by group
Intervention group categories
Hospital characteristics
Static group
median
(n=13)
Intervention
group median
(n=24) p Value*
Early
adopter
median (n=6)
Early/late
majority
median (n=12)
Laggard
median
(n=6) p Value**
Bed size 25 25 0.70 25 25 21 0.62
County population 9132 7047 0.32 6869 9592 3994 0.18
Survey response rate (%) 76 81 0.84 82 80 80 0.80
Eligible employees 137 108 0.20 124.5 108 74.5 0.28
No of TeamSTEPPS master trainers NA 3 – 3.5 3 3 0.72
No of TeamSTEPPS coaches NA 2 – 2.5 1.5 1 0.79
No of 17 support calls in which
hospitals participated
NA 6 – 7 9.5 2.5 0.01
*p Values derived from Mann–Whitney test.
**p Values derived from Kruskal–Wallis test.
TeamSTEPPS, team strategies and tools to enhance performance and patient safety.
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and probability values less than 0.05 were considered
statistically significant.
RESULTS
Hospital and respondent characteristics
Of the 4601 personnel in the 37 hospitals who were
eligible to participate in the survey, 3465 (75.3%)
responded. Hospital characteristics are reported in
table 1. Laggard hospitals participated in a signifi-
cantly fewer number of support calls than did the
other two adopter categories. Although not statistic-
ally significant, laggard hospitals had smaller numbers
of employees, smaller median bed sizes, and trained
fewer coaches than did the other two adopter
categories.
Respondent characteristics are reported in table 2.
There were statistically significant differences in the
distribution of positions and work areas and the pro-
portion of employees with direct patient contact
between the intervention and static groups. Only the
distribution of respondents by work area, tenure at
the hospital and tenure in the profession differed sig-
nificantly between the adopter categories. Of note,
19% of respondents in early adopter hospitals
compared to approximately 27% in the other categor-
ies had worked at the hospital for 16 years or more.
Cross-sectional comparison of HSOPS results
by hospital group
Supplementary appendix A (available online only)
reports results for the survey dimensions, items,
internal consistency of the dimensions, and the added
training, learning and transfer items by hospital group
for the 37 hospitals. The intervention group had sig-
nificantly greater positive scores than did the static
group in the survey dimensions organisational learn-
ing—continuous improvement (76% vs 71%), team-
work within departments (82% vs 80%) and
teamwork across hospital departments (67% vs 62%).
The early adopter hospitals had significantly greater
positive scores than did the early/late majority and
laggard hospitals in the survey dimensions frequency
of events reported (71% vs 65% and 56%), staffing
(76% vs 70% and 64%) and hospital management
support for patient safety (89% vs 83% and 75%).
The early adopter hospitals had significantly greater
positive scores than did the laggard hospitals in all
survey dimensions. The Cronbach’s α coefficients for
the dimensions varied across the groups from 0.57 to
Table 2 Characteristics of respondents participating in 2009 hospital survey on patient safety culture by group
Intervention group categories
Respondent characteristics
Static group
mean %
(n=1328)
Intervention
group mean %
(n=2137)
p
Value*
Early adopter
mean %
(n=574)
Early/late
majority mean
% (n=1195)
Laggard
mean %
(n=368)
p
Value*
Position <0.001 0.13
Administration/management 11.7 10.2 – 10.4 9.9 11.0 –
Provider 6.4 5.7 – 5.0 5.8 6.6 –
Nurse 27.0 32.0 – 31.6 33.2 28.6 –
Allied health 21.7 23.3 – 23.9 23.3 22.5 –
Clinical support staff 9.9 11.8 – 8.6 12.8 13.2 –
Non-clinical support staff 15.3 11.2 – 13.6 9.7 12.6 –
Other 8.1 5.7 – 6.8 5.3 5.5 –
Direct patient contact 77.2 80.1 0.009 78.7 82.2 80.1 0.20
Work area <0.001 0.002
Many different departments 13.7 10.7 – 13.0 9.2 12.3 –
Acute/skilled care 22.7 25.7 – 26.3 24.4 28.8 –
Ancillary departments 42.0 47.0 – 42.9 51.2 39.7 –
Physician’s clinic 10.1 9.4 – 11.0 8.1 11.0 –
Other 11.4 7.3 – 6.8 7.2 8.2 –
Tenure at hospital 0.35 <0.001
0–5 years 41.3 41.5 – 42.3 42.7 36.6 –
6–15 years 32.0 33.8 – 39.3 30.6 35.5 –
16 years or more 26.7 24.7 – 18.5 26.7 27.9 –
Tenure in profession 0.63 <0.001
0–5 years 28.4 28.6 – 34.0 27.3 24.3 –
6–15 years 32.9 34.2 – 36.1 33.8 32.5 –
16 years or more 38.7 37.2 – 29.9 32.5 43.1 –
*p Values derived from χ2 tests.
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Table 3 OR of responding positively in 2009 compared to baseline by adoption category for HSOPS items reflecting four components of safety culture
Early adopter (n ranges from 296–317)†
Early/late majority (n ranges from 636–
684)† Laggard (n ranges from 177–190)†
Mean % positive Mean % positive Mean % positive
HSOPS dimensions and items by components of culture OR (95% CI) Baseline 2009 OR (95% CI) Baseline 2009 OR (95% CI) Baseline 2009
Reporting culture
Frequency of events reported
D1. When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the
patient, how often is this reported?‡
1.13 (0.85 to 1.49) 62 65 1.01 (0.84 to 1.22) 57 57 0.85 (0.60 to1.21) 45 41
Just culture
Non-punitive response to error
A16. Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file§ 1.28 (1.00 to 1.65) 48 54 1.09 (0.92 to 1.30) 51 53 1.05 (0.75 to 1.45) 43 44
Flexible culture
Teamwork within departments
A11. When one area in this department gets really busy, others help out¶ 1.21 (0.89 to 1.63) 73 77 1.32** (1.09 to 1.61) 68 74 0.82 (0.58 to 1.16) 66 61
Staffing
A14. We work in ‘crisis mode’ trying to do too much, too quickly§ 1.67** (1.18 to 2.36) 64 75 1.19 (0.95 to 1.49) 63 67 1.02 (0.67 to 1.57) 66 67
Communication openness
C4. Staff feel free to question the decisions and actions of those with more authority¶ 1.18 (0.92 to 1.52) 51 55 1.26** (1.06 to1.49) 45 50 0.84 (0.60 to 1.16) 46 42
Hospital handoffs and transitions
F5. Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes§ 1.00 (0.77 to 1.30) 61 61 0.99 (0.83 to 1.18) 54 54 0.64* (0.46 to 0.90) 55 44
F7. Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital
departments§
0.73* (0.56 to 0.94) 64 56 1.01 (0.85 to 1.19) 49 49 0.71* (0.51 to 0.98) 49 40
Learning culture
Organisational learning
A9. Mistakes have led to positive changes here¶ 1.45* (1.05 to 1.99) 75 81 1.29* (1.05 to 1.57) 68 73 1.29 (0.90 to 1.83) 60 65
Hospital management support for patient safety
F9. Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse
event happens§
1.37 (1.00 to 1.88) 77 82 1.15 (0.95 to 1.38) 68 71 1.25 (0.89 to 1.74) 58 63
Overall perceptions of safety
A10. It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around here§ 1.30 (0.95 to 1.77) 78 82 1.28* (1.06 to 1.56) 72 77 1.00 (0.72 to 1.39) 61 61
Item aggregate 65.3 68.8 59.5 62.5 54.9 52.8
*p<0.05.
**p<0.01.
†As 1–4% of item-level data are missing at random, the n for an item varies slightly within each adopter category.
‡Most of the time and always are positive responses.
§Strongly disagree and disagree are positive responses.
¶Agree and strongly agree are positive responses.
HSOPS, hospital survey on patient safety culture.
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Table 4 2009 OR of responding positively to a HSOPS item for each 5% increase in the proportion of respondents reporting TeamSTEPPS training, learning and transfer
Dimensions and items by culture component
Some training* OR
(95% CI)
p
Value
All training† OR
(95% CI)
p
Value
Learning‡ OR
(95% CI)
p
Value
Transfer§ OR
(95% CI)
p
Value
Reporting culture
Frequency of events reported
D15. When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the
patient, how often is this reported?††
1.02 (0.98 to 1.07) 0.35 1.03 (0.98 to 1.03) 0.18 1.05 (1.00 to 1.10) 0.04 1.20 (1.08 to 1.34) 0.002
Just culture
Non-punitive response to error
A16. Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file** 1.02 (0.98 to 1.06) 0.41 1.02 (0.98 to 1.06) 0.40 1.02 (0.98 to 1.06) 0.35 1.11 (1.01 to 1.23) 0.04
Flexible culture
Teamwork within departments
A11. When one area in this department gets really busy, others help out¶ 1.02 (0.98 to 1.07) 0.26 1.00 (0.96 to 1.04) 0.90 1.00 (0.96 to 1.05) 0.94 1.15 (1.05–1.27) 0.005
Staffing
A14. We work in ‘crisis mode’ trying to do too much, too quickly** 1.03 (0.99 to 1.08) 0.17 1.03 (0.99 to 1.08) 0.15 1.06 (1.01 to 1.11) 0.02 1.11 (0.98 to 1.26) 0.09
Communication openness
C4. Staff feel free to question the decisions and actions of those with more
authority¶
1.02 (0.99 to 1.06) 0.17 1.01 (0.98 to 1.05) 0.41 1.02 (0.98 to 1.05) 0.28 1.11 (1.03 to 1.21) 0.01
Hospital handoffs and transitions
F5. Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes** 1.03 (0.98 to 1.09) 0.18 1.03 (0.98 to 1.08) 0.25 1.05 (1.00 to 1.10) 0.07 1.22 (1.09 to 1.36) 0.001
F7. Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital
departments**
1.03 (0.98 to 1.09) 0.22 1.031 (0.98 to 1.09) 0.22 1.05 (0.99 to 1.10) 0.08 1.19 (1.06 to 1.35) 0.006
Learning culture
Organisational learning
A9. Mistakes have led to positive changes here¶ 1.03 (0.99 to 1.06) 0.19 1.04 (1.00 to 1.08) 0.04 1.06 (1.02 to 1.09) 0.006 1.20 (1.11 to 1.29) <0.001
Hospital management support for patient safety
F9. Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse
event happens**
1.03 (0.97 to 1.09) 0.36 1.04 (0.98 to 1.10) 0.16 1.07 (1.01 to 1.13) 0.02 1.24 (1.10 to 1.41) 0.002
Overall perceptions of safety
A10. It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around
here**
1.07 (1.02 to 1.12) 0.01 1.02 (0.97 to 1.07) 0.40 1.05 (1.00 to 1.11) 0.05 1.25 (1.13 to 1.40) <0.001
*Some training, completed some TeamSTEPPS modules.
†All training, completed all TeamSTEPPS modules or master trainer.
‡Learning, correctly answered three of four TeamSTEPPS knowledge questions.
§Transfer, responded that four of five team actions are performed ‘Most of the time/always’.
¶Agree and strongly agree are positive responses.
**Strongly disagree and disagree are positive responses.
††Most of the time and always are positive responses.
HSOPS, hospital survey on patient safety culture; TeamSTEPPS, team strategies and tools to enhance performance and patient safety.
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0.87. The dimensions staffing and organisational
learning—continuous improvement had coefficients
below the suggested value for acceptable reliability of
0.70.45
TeamSTEPPS training and learning were signifi-
cantly more prevalent in the intervention group than
the static group (59% vs 5% and 25% vs 2%, respect-
ively). There was no statistically significant difference
between the proportions of respondents who reported
the adoption of team behaviours (transfer) in the
intervention compared to the static group (15% vs
12%). Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of transfer
in the intervention hospitals by adopter categories.
Within the early adopter hospitals, an average of 83%
of respondents reported receiving training, 44%
demonstrated learning and 26% reported transfer.
These values for training, learning and transfer were
62%, 27% and 18% in early/late majority hospitals,
and 27%, 11% and 7% in laggard hospitals.
Longitudinal comparison of HSOPS results by adopter
category
Of the 2137 respondents in the intervention group,
1190 (56%) had both baseline and reassessment data.
Table 3 compares these respondents’ average baseline
and reassessment scores for 10 HSOPS items repre-
senting Reason’s four components of safety culture,
and it provides the odds of a respondent reacting
positively to an item at reassessment compared to
baseline. The average baseline scores for early adopter
hospitals were 5.8% greater than those in early/late
majority hospitals and 10.4% greater than those in
laggard hospitals. The average changes in scores from
baseline to reassessment were 3.5%, 3.0% and −2.1%
for the adopter categories, respectively.
There was variability by adopter category in the
odds of a respondent reacting positively to an item at
reassessment compared to baseline.
For early adopter respondents, the odds of reacting
positively at reassessment compared to baseline were
significantly:
▸ greater for two items that represent flexible (A14) and
learning (A9) cultures, and were
▸ less for one item representing flexible culture (F7).
For early/late majority respondents, the odds of
reacting positively at reassessment compared to base-
line were significantly:
▸ greater for four items representing flexible (A11, C4)
and learning cultures (A9, A10).
For laggard respondents, the odds of reacting posi-
tively at reassessment compared to baseline were
significantly:
▸ less for two items representing flexible culture (F5, F7).
Cross-sectional comparison of HSOPS results
using Kirkpatrick’s taxonomy
Table 4 provides OR of responding positively to the
10 HSOPS items for each 5% increase in the
proportion of respondents reporting training, learning
(level 2) and transfer (level 3). For every 5% increase
in the proportion reporting some training in
TeamSTEPPS, there was a significant:
▸ increase in the odds that a respondent would react posi-
tively to one item representing learning culture (A10).
For every 5% increase in the proportion reporting
that they had received training in all of the modules
or that they were a master trainer, there was a
significant:
▸ increase in the odds that a respondent would react posi-
tively to one item representing learning culture (A9).
For every 5% increase in the proportion demon-
strating that they had learned TeamSTEPPS tools,
there was a significant:
▸ increase in the odds that a respondent would react posi-
tively to five items reflecting reporting (D15), flexible
(A14) and learning (A9, F9, A10) cultures.
For every 5% increase in the proportion reporting
transfer, there was a significant:
▸ increase in the odds that a respondent would react posi-
tively to nine items reflecting all four components of
safety culture.
DISCUSSION
We sought to rigorously evaluate the impact of the
TeamSTEPPS team training programme on hospital
safety culture by using two designs recommended for
quasi-experimental research: comparison of results to
a static group and a pre-post comparison.46 Results
from the static group comparison (see supplementary
appendix A, available online only) indicate that the
team training intervention was associated with signifi-
cantly greater hospital-level positive HSOPS scores in
three survey dimensions reflecting flexible and learn-
ing cultures. Results from the pre-post comparison
(table 3) indicate that the intervention was associated
with changes in individual respondents’ perceptions
of flexible and learning cultures, and that the direc-
tion and magnitude of these changes varies by
adopter category. In particular, individual respondents
in the early adopter and laggard hospitals were signifi-
cantly less likely to have a positive perception of hos-
pital handoffs and transitions post-intervention
compared to baseline. This decrease is consistent with
the phenomenon of response shift bias, which occurs
in pre-post comparisons when participation in an
intervention changes a respondent’s frame of refer-
ence.47 Therefore, participating in the HSOPS and
learning and/or adopting team skills may have
changed respondents’ reference point regarding what
defines an effective handoff. Participating in the
HSOPS increases awareness of patient safety concepts
and behaviours,48 and is considered a patient safety
initiative.49 Finally, the fact that 12% of respondents
in the static group reported the adoption of team
behaviours indicates the potential for response shift
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bias at reassessment if these hospitals conduct team
training.
Results from assessing the discrete impact of train-
ing, learning and transfer on safety culture (table 4)
reveal a dose–response relationship between the levels
of Kirkpatrick’s taxonomy: simply participating in
training had minimal impact on perceptions of safety
culture, learning TeamSTEPPS tools had a moderate
impact on perceptions of safety culture, and transfer-
ring learning to behaviour had the greatest impact
because it increased the odds of reacting positively to
nine of the 10 survey items reflecting all four compo-
nents of safety culture. This dose–response relation-
ship is consistent with what is referred to as the
‘transfer problem’50 51—the fact that much of the
training conducted by organisations does not produce
transfer of learning to behaviour in the work
environment.
Grossman and Salas51 have concisely reviewed the
factors that address the transfer problem. These
factors include employee characteristics (eg, motiv-
ation, perceived utility of training), the design of the
training (eg, role modelling, opportunities to practise),
and the work environment (transfer climate, support
from supervisors and peers, follow-up learning oppor-
tunities). These factors are consistent with characteris-
tics associated with Rogers’ categories of adopters and
with movement through the organisational stages of
adoption. The design of the TeamSTEPPS training
curriculum, which was used by all intervention hospi-
tals, is standardised and incorporates factors such as
behavioural modelling and error management known
to facilitate transfer.
There is evidence that employee characteristics and
work environments differed across the adopter cat-
egories. Employees in laggard hospitals had signifi-
cantly less employee turnover than did the other
adopter categories, possibly indicating that employees
who experienced job dissatisfaction in these hospitals
remained on the job but were poorly motivated.30 52
This response is consistent with limited employment
options in isolated rural areas. The work environment
differed among the adopter groups in several ways.
First, early adopter and early/late majority hospitals
tended to be larger and remained significantly more
connected to the collaborative by participating in con-
ference calls than did the laggard hospitals. Larger
size (indicating potentially slack resources) and a
higher degree of interconnectedness are characteristics
that are positively associated with organisational inno-
vativeness30 and thus, transfer. Second, early adopter
and early/late majority hospitals focused on training
supervisors/managers who could then support transfer
by providing feedback, and they implemented mul-
tiple follow-up learning opportunities (bulletin
boards, newsletter articles, new employee orientation).
Finally, as indicated by baseline HSOPS scores, the
laggard hospitals began the intervention with less
mature safety cultures than did the early adopter and
early/late majority hospitals. The laggards did not
have as strong a foundation of management support
for patient safety and reporting and learning from
error as did the other two adopter categories.
Therefore, the laggard hospitals had the greatest need
for team training but had the least success in imple-
mentation, which reflects Rogers’ innovativeness/need
paradox—those organisations in greatest need of an
innovation are the last to adopt.30
Strengths and limitations
There are several strengths that support our ability to
draw a causal inference between the intervention and
changes in perceptions of safety culture. We estab-
lished that the reliability of the HSOPS in our sample
of critical access hospitals was comparable to that
reported for other populations.40 49 53 We used two
quasi-experimental designs thus limiting potential
confounding due to maturation and history. We con-
ducted the HSOPS within each hospital in a standar-
dised manner enabling us to pool the results validly.
Because we linked baseline and reassessment responses
at the individual level, we were able to compare post-
training to pre-training results and assess the impact
of discrete changes in training, learning and transfer
on safety culture. We allowed nearly a year for the
intervention to produce the desired result of change
in safety culture.31 We used appropriate statistical
techniques to account for the correlated nature of the
data at the hospital and respondent levels,46 and we
prospectively used two theoretical frameworks to
guide our analysis and interpretation.29 Finally, the
median response rates for all hospital groups were
76% and greater thus minimising non-response bias.
There are limitations that may affect the interpret-
ation of these results. As with many quality improve-
ment initiatives, these hospitals self-selected to
participate, they were not randomly assigned to the
intervention and static groups, and we did not inde-
pendently audit the prevalence of team behaviours.
There was variability in the extent to which each hos-
pital followed the TeamSTEPPS curriculum within
their hospital and implemented their action plan for
implementation and sustainment. This study was con-
ducted in critical access hospitals, which may limit its
generalisability to larger hospitals. However, the con-
sistency of our findings with theoretical frameworks
tends to mitigate these limitations. In addition, the
small size of these hospitals made it reasonable to
assume that culture change could occur within a year.
Finally, we had limited power to detect differences
between adopter categories due to small sample size.
CONCLUSION AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Team training can result in transformational change in
safety culture when the work environment supports
transfer of learning to behaviour. First, this work
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environment must include a foundation of reporting
and learning from error. Second, managers and senior
leaders should understand that we ‘learn to team’
because teamwork is essential for learning, adapting,
and providing safe care in the current complex health-
care environment.54 Without this knowledge, mid-
level managers will not role model team behaviours
and senior leaders will not allocate the financial and
human resources needed to sustain ongoing training
that includes learning opportunities such as newslet-
ters, new employee orientation, annual refresher
courses and opportunities to practise including simula-
tion. Senior leaders must also ensure that team beha-
viours are routinised by revising job descriptions and
performance appraisals to include team behaviours. In
summary, the laggards in our study were in greatest
need of teamwork, but were least likely to adopt
because their work environment did not support
training, learning, or transfer. Additional research is
needed to understand the barriers to establishing a
work environment that supports the transfer of team
training in hospitals.
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